Istanbul – Sources privy to the ongoing Pakistan–Afghanistan negotiations in Turkey have confirmed to the Hindukush Tribune Network that under Ankara’s mediation, the second day of the third round of Istanbul talks saw Pakistan formally present its proposal to the Afghan Taliban delegation. Discussions continued through the day as both sides examined the points contained in the proposal, with talks set to resume on Friday. 

The third round of negotiations began on November 6, with a six-member high-level Taliban delegation led by Afghan Intelligence Chief Abdul Haq Wasiq and assisted by Deputy Interior Minister Rahmatullah Najib. Other members include Foreign Ministry Second Secretary Zakir Jalali, Amir Khan Muttaqi’s Special Assistant Abdul Qahir Balkhi, Haqqani Network and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) liaison figure Anas Haqqani, and Sohail Shaheen, known for his influential role in previous international negotiations.

Pakistan’s Delegation and Immediate Security Context

The Pakistani delegation is headed by Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Lieutenant General Asim Malik, currently serving his second term, supported by the Afghan Desk and senior personnel from the Strategic Communications Units. The negotiations come at a time when Islamabad is directly confronting what it describes as undeclared warfare waged from Afghan territory by TTP militants and their support networks.

Commitments Made by the Taliban and Pakistan’s Position

Pakistan has reminded mediators that the Afghan Taliban regime has made extensive written and verbal commitments to the international community to prevent Afghan soil from being used for terrorism against any country and to engage in intra-Afghan dialogue. Notable commitments include the Doha Agreement of 2020 with the United States and a trilateral agreement signed with Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates. However, officials assert that the Taliban have failed to honour these obligations and have instead benefited financially and diplomatically while refusing to deliver on security assurances.

Breakdown of the Doha Process and Post-Takeover Governance

The first part of the 2020 Doha Accord required the Taliban to enter negotiations with the Afghan government and ensure released prisoners did not return to militant activity. Pakistan and international monitors observed the opposite: most of the 5,000 released fighters immediately re-joined combat, strengthening the Taliban war effort that culminated in the takeover of Kabul. After re-establishing their administration, the Taliban reinstated exclusionary policies, banning women from education and employment and restoring a governance structure dominated by Pashtun militant leaders.

Ethnic Power Concentration in the Taliban Cabinet

The current Taliban cabinet confirms this concentration of power. Of a 49-member administration, only minimal representation is given to Tajiks, Uzbeks, Nuristanis or Baloch, despite Afghanistan’s ethnic composition being far more diverse, Pashtuns at 42%, Tajiks at 27%, Uzbeks at 9%, and Hazaras at 8%. Key ministries and the Kandahar Shura that directs ideological and political decisions remain controlled exclusively by Pashtun figures drawn from the former militant leadership.

Presence of Al-Qaeda and TTP Under Taliban Protection

The second component of the Doha Agreement required the Taliban to prevent Afghan territory from being used by individuals or groups threatening other states. Evidence directly contradicts this commitment. 

Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in central Kabul in August 2022 by a US drone strike, a year after the Taliban took power. Former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Al-Qaeda case officer Sarah Adams has repeatedly stated that Saif al-Adl and Hamza bin Laden are living in Kabul under Taliban protection. The United Nation Monitoring Team’s 35th report (February 2025) confirmed Saif al-Adl’s efforts to reorganize Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and reactivate cells in Iraq, Libya, and Europe. The 36th UN Monitoring Report (2025) established that the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) has provided guest houses, movement passes, weapons permits, and immunity from arrest to TTP leaders operating from Kabul. The 66th SIGAR Quarterly Report (January 2025) estimated 6,000–6,500 TTP militants based in Afghanistan alongside at least 12 senior Al-Qaeda figures. The same report noted the killing of 16 Pakistani security personnel in South Waziristan by TTP fighters. The 68th SIGAR Report (July 2025) recorded Taliban safe havens extending to ISIS-Khorasan networks as well.

Failure of the Trilateral Relocation Agreement

In 2024, Pakistan, the Taliban regime, and the UAE signed a trilateral agreement in which the Taliban pledged to relocate TTP militants away from border regions and halt cross-border infiltration. Funding was secured from the UAE for this relocation. Only a few hundred fighters were moved, with no monitoring mechanism and no lists shared with Islamabad or Abu Dhabi. The majority of TTP cadres remained operational and continued attacks.

Cross-Border Militancy and Diversion of International Aid

Despite the Taliban receiving roughly USD 80 million a month from US sources and substantial aid routed through UN agencies, this funding has not moderated their conduct. Regional analysts assess that relief funds directed for refugee support have been diverted to TTP networks. Between April and October 2025, over 135 Afghan nationals were killed during counter-terror operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Pakistan has identified 267 Afghan nationals killed while actively fighting Pakistani security forces. Among them was Badruddin alias Yusuf, son of Maulvi Ghulam Muhammad Ahmadi, deputy governor of Badghis Province; and an Afghan police official, Qasim alias Milyar, from Giyan District, Paktika, who was killed while participating in infiltration attempts near North Waziristan.

Major Clashes and Taliban’s Implicit Admission

On April 25–26, 2025, 45 Afghan militants were neutralized in North Waziristan, and on August 7, 70 were killed in Sambaza, Zhob. The Taliban government’s subsequent request for the return of bodies marked a rare de facto admission of cross-border militant involvement. Pakistan has identified 58 TTP and Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) camps, safe houses, and staging facilities operating inside Afghanistan with the full knowledge of the Taliban regime. Additionally, US-sourced NATO weapons valued at approximately USD 7 billion have been transferred to anti-Pakistan militant groups, dramatically enhancing their battlefield capability.

Record of Pakistan’s Diplomatic Outreach

Since the Taliban takeover in 2021, Pakistan has made sustained diplomatic attempts to resolve security concerns, including four Foreign Minister-level visits, two missions led by Defence Ministers and DG ISI, five Special Representative missions, five Secretary-level meetings, one visit by the National Security Advisor, eight Joint Coordination Committee sessions, 225 border flag meetings, 836 protest communications, and 13 formal diplomatic demarches.

Structural Barriers to Peace and the Road Ahead

The structural issue, Pakistani officials argue, is internal to Afghanistan. The country’s ethnic composition requires inclusive governance, yet decision-making remains confined to ultraconservative Pashtun power circles. Without representation of Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, and other communities, claims of national unity remain political fiction. 

Lasting peace requires an inclusive Afghan political settlement; anything less leaves the state reliant on coercion and militant patronage. 

Pakistan has stated that if the Taliban regime continues violating its commitments, the international community must hold it accountable, and punitive measures will inevitably follow. The Istanbul negotiations, while diplomatically significant, are overshadowed by the accumulated record of duplicity, escalating cross-border terrorism, ethnic exclusion, and weaponized ideological governance. Whether the Taliban chooses dialogue or confrontation will define the next phase of the region’s stability, or its deepening volatility.

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