Militancy, Misinformation, and the Taliban’s Blame Game Over ISKP

Islamabad – Militancy remains one of the defining global challenges of the 21st century, and the only sustainable solution across borders is cooperation, whether states embrace it or not. Nowhere is this clearer than in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where decades of conflict, porous borders, and political mistrust continue to fuel instability. Both countries share a 2,640 km border that has historically facilitated trade and familial connections, but it has also long served as a conduit for militant movement. Pakistan has repeatedly offered cooperation to successive Afghan governments, including the current Taliban regime, yet meaningful progress has been slow, consistently undermined by blame-shifting and selective narratives.

A Claim, a Killing, and a Familiar Deflection

A recent wave of claims propagated through Afghan Taliban–linked intelligence channels, including Al-Mirsad, alleged that a senior Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) commander named Burhan, also known as Zaid, had been killed by unknown assailants in Punjab, Pakistan. The report was amplified by former US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, who described the development as “good news” and implied that Pakistan had quietly eliminated a major ISKP figure. Islamabad immediately rejected the narrative. Pakistan’s Ministry of Information and Broadcasting clarified that no counterterrorism operation took place and that the incident was actually a criminal killing that occurred on 5 March 2025 in Habibabad, Kasur district. Investigators linked the murder to robbery or personal enmity and filed a formal FIR on 6 March. Officials emphasized that Burhan had no connection to ISKP, was not a commander, and had been living with his father-in-law near Nai Sabzi Mandi, Habibabad.

In another strand of disinformation propagated by Al-Mirsad, former CIA officer Sarah Adams directly challenged the Taliban narrative regarding a man named Hasan, whom the Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence described as a senior ISKP commander killed in Karachi. Adams dismissed the claim as entirely fabricated, asserting that Hasan was not ISKP, not ISIS, and had never been affiliated with any terrorist organization. She further revealed that the Taliban had falsified his origin story, claiming he was from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan, when in fact he hailed from Achin district in Nangarhar, ironically one of ISKP’s most entrenched strongholds inside Afghanistan. Adams characterized the Taliban’s intelligence apparatus as “nonsense” and a danger to itself, noting that such propaganda undermines genuine counter-terror intelligence efforts and ultimately serves to empower terrorist networks.

Historical Trajectory: The Attempt to Link ISKP to Pakistan

Efforts to connect ISKP to Pakistan are not new. Since its formal emergence in January 2015, ISKP has been a cross-border amalgamation, drawing primarily from splinter factions of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and, to a lesser extent, dissident Afghan Taliban commanders. These militants were attracted to the transnational ideology of the Islamic State, rejecting the nationalist agendas of both TTP and the Afghan Taliban. This dual origin made ISKP’s operational geography inherently fluid. Following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, Kabul increasingly framed ISKP attacks, including the devastating Kabul Airport bombing, high-profile killings such as that of Khalil ur Rehman Haqqani, and strikes against Shia communities, as being Pakistan-driven. Analysts note that this rhetorical shift served a political purpose, deflecting international scrutiny over unfulfilled commitments to the Doha Agreement and subsequent engagements.

By early 2025, blaming Pakistan for ISKP had become an entrenched narrative, especially as Islamabad pressed the Taliban on the presence of TTP sanctuaries. Yet United Nations Security Council Monitoring Team reports consistently show that ISKP’s core structures remain inside Afghanistan. Eastern Afghanistan, particularly Nangarhar and Kunar, continues to serve as ISKP’s long-standing stronghold, while northern provinces such as Badakhshan, Jawzjan, and Sar-e-Pol have become strategic expansion areas that facilitate recruitment and cross-border operations. Urban centers, particularly Kabul, have emerged as stages for high-impact terror, designed to undermine Taliban claims of security. The UN also highlights that ISKP has transitioned from large visible camps to smaller, cell-based networks supported by multilingual propaganda in Dari, Pashto, Uzbek, and Russian. Member states continue to warn that Afghanistan’s security environment is permissive, allowing ISKP and Al-Qaeda to regroup and reorganize.

Afghan Taliban claims of neutralizing ISKP operatives have consistently drawn scrutiny. High-profile arrests include Farishta Jami, a woman from Stratford-upon-Avon sentenced to life in prison for planning to travel to Afghanistan to join ISKP, and Adil Panjsheri and Tariq Tajiki, key ISKP members linked to the Kerman attack. Sarah Adams accused the Taliban of fabricating or recycling announcements of the deaths of major ISKP figures, including Gulmurod Khalimov, Umar Farooq, and Qais Laghmani. She described the Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence as a “propaganda commission,” warning that such misdirection only strengthens terrorist networks rather than diminishing them.

The Pakistan–Afghanistan Militant Nexus: Cooperation vs. Deflection

Militancy remains a shared and enduring threat for both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the 2,640 km porous border demands cooperation rather than political deflection. Pakistan has repeatedly offered joint mechanisms to tackle cross-border militancy, including during engagements in Doha and later in Istanbul. However, Afghan Taliban officials have declined to take substantive action against TTP or BLA networks. Deputy Interior Minister Rahmatullah Najib admitted that Istanbul talks collapsed after the Taliban refused to act against TTP or BLA operatives, proposing instead to “relocate” TTP fighters if Pakistan first reclassified them as “good people.” Najib’s comments reveal a pattern of shielding militant networks while deflecting accountability.

This week, the killing of Qari Hedayatullah, a TTP commander linked to attacks at Peshawar Police Lines and Mina Bazar, in an IED blast in Nangarhar underscores that TTP networks continue to operate inside Afghanistan. Pakistan’s detailed records reflect the scale of the threat. Islamabad reports that Afghan Taliban officials provide transport, security, permits, and lodging to TTP and BLA operatives, with 58 terrorist camps and staging posts identified inside Afghanistan. Since June 2025, approximately 172 TTP formations, totaling around 4,000 fighters, infiltrated Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, marking 36% and 48% increases across relevant categories, while 83 formations, about 1,200 militants, crossed from southern Afghan provinces into Balochistan. TTP chief Noor Wali Mehsud reportedly resides in Kabul on a stipend of USD 43,000. Following reported strikes in Kabul on 7 May, Noor Wali issued urgent voice notes that analysts interpret as tacit confirmation of his presence.

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Pakistan’s Record Against ISKP and Taliban Counterclaims

Pakistan’s counterterrorism record contradicts Afghan assertions of unchecked ISKP presence in Pakistan. In March 2025, Mohammad Sharifullah, also known as Jafar, an ISKP operational commander linked to the Kabul Airport Abbey Gate attack, was arrested near the border and extradited to the United States. In 2024, Pakistan conducted a multi-province crackdown, arresting 48 ISKP operatives, including planners involved in attacks in Russia and Iran. In September 2023, Abdul Bari, the alleged mastermind behind the 2021 massacre of Hazara miners in Balochistan, was apprehended near Quetta. These operations reflect Pakistan’s consistent actions against ISKP, both domestically and transnationally, challenging Kabul’s narrative of unimpeded ISKP growth inside Pakistani territory.

Cooperation Remains the Missing Piece

Pakistan’s repeated warnings about TTP sanctuaries and cross-border militancy have often been met with moralistic responses or deliberate misinformation from Kabul. Misreported incidents, such as the so-called Punjab killing, illustrate how the Afghan Taliban manipulate narratives to deflect attention from their inaction against groups like the TTP and ISKP. By falsely linking ordinary criminal cases or local disputes to ISKP activity, Kabul shifts accountability while allowing both TTP and ISKP networks to maintain operational space. Analysts warn that in an era of evolving regional threats, such misinformation undermines genuine cooperation, gives terrorist groups room to regroup, and perpetuates instability across both sides of the border.