Islamabad / Kabul — Afghanistan’s Interim Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, has stated that recent negotiations between Kabul and Islamabad failed due to what he described as Pakistan’s “unreasonable and impractical” demands. Speaking on November 9 at the graduation ceremony of the Foreign Ministry’s Diplomacy Institute, Muttaqi claimed that the Pakistani delegation sought “guarantees” that no security incidents would occur inside Pakistan in the future, a demand he argued was beyond Afghanistan’s responsibility or authority.
Muttaqi stressed that the Afghan Interim Government seeks “constructive and respectful” relations with Pakistan but warned that any attempt to impose policies against Afghanistan’s sovereignty would be met with firm resistance. He framed Kabul’s approach as one rooted in goodwill and regional stability, asserting that Afghanistan retains the right to defend its territorial integrity.
He stated that Pakistan’s security challenges, particularly the presence and activities of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), predate the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. “Pakistan’s problems are not new,” he said. “TTP has been active in Pakistan for 25 years, and Pakistani officials themselves have said that 70,000 to 80,000 people were killed in the past two decades of conflict.”
Muttaqi accused Pakistan of using tools such as border closures, trade restrictions, and pressure on Afghan refugees as leverage against Kabul. He reiterated the Interim Government’s stated policy of maintaining balanced relations with all neighbors, enhancing regional connectivity, and leveraging Afghanistan’s strategic location for transit and trade.
According to Muttaqi, Pakistan has repeatedly violated Afghan sovereignty, including strikes that he said targeted civilian areas and even Kabul’s airspace. He criticized Islamabad for what he described as contradictory positions regarding the TTP: blaming Afghanistan for harboring the group while simultaneously suggesting relocating fighters to Afghan territory. He further questioned how militants could cross the border despite fencing, surveillance systems, and fortified checkpoints on the Pakistani side.
The Minister said that during talks in Qatar and multiple rounds in Istanbul, the Afghan delegation engaged “with sincerity,” while Pakistan walked away. He reiterated that Afghan soil will not be used against any country and expressed respect for the Pakistani people, religious scholars, and political voices advocating peace. However, he issued a warning: if “certain circles” in Pakistan pursue hostile agendas, Afghanistan would respond decisively, claiming the Afghan nation stands united behind its system.
Muttaqi also dismissed Pakistan’s claim that militant activity surged after the Taliban takeover, arguing Pakistan’s internal challenges, ranging from political instability to economic pressures, are unrelated to Afghanistan. He criticized Pakistan’s crackdown on Afghan refugees and claimed that Kabul facilitated previous talks between Pakistan and the TTP that, according to him, had “90% of issues resolved” before Pakistan allegedly disrupted the process. He also said the current regime constructed hundreds of checkpoints along the Durand Line [Pakistan-Afghanistan international border] and relocated refugees at its own expense to address Pakistan’s concerns.
Pakistan’s Position: Safe Havens in Afghanistan, Not Internal Issues
Islamabad categorically rejects Kabul’s claims. Pakistani officials maintain that more than 80% of TTP attacks since August 2021 have been planned and executed from Afghan territory, citing United Nation Security Council monitoring reports. Officials argue that the Taliban regime is providing sanctuary to TTP leadership as a “payback” for wartime allegiance, rather than treating their presence as a humanitarian matter.
Security sources insist that every cross-border strike conducted in Afghanistan targeted designated terrorist compounds after actionable intelligence was shared with Kabul and ignored. Those neutralized in these operations include key commanders such as Farman Al-Karamah, Sadiqullah Dawar, Ghazi Madakhel, and other senior figures linked to Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s network.
Refuting Kabul’s allegation that ISIS-K originates or trains inside Pakistan, analysts emphasised, UN Security Council monitoring reports, regional intelligence assessments, and international counterterrorism investigations consistently place the group’s core presence in eastern Afghanistan, particularly Kunar, Nangarhar, and Kabul. Pakistani security forces, working in cooperation with the United States intelligence, captured a senior ISKP operational commander, Mohammad Sharifullah, in March 2025, underscoring coordinated efforts to disrupt the group’s networks. In a separate seven-month operation in 2024, Pakistani authorities dismantled a 48-member ISKP cell implicated in planning attacks abroad, including operations in Russia and Iran.
Evidence from outside the region also aligns with Islamabad’s position. In the US, individuals with reported ISKP links have been arrested after entering the country illegally, including an Afghan national charged in October 2024 over an alleged Election Day attack plot. German authorities charged foreign nationals in April 2024 for plotting ISKP-related attacks, while the February 2025 Munich attack was carried out by an Afghan asylum seeker described as having an “Islamist orientation.” In India, three suspects were arrested in November 2025 for a ricin-related terror conspiracy, with one allegedly in contact with ISKP operatives based in Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, the Afghan interim government claims it has conducted large-scale operations against ISKP within Afghanistan, stating it has arrested up to 1,700 militants and killed nearly 1,100 others since August 2021. Islamabad argues that the continued external coordination capacity of ISKP leadership networks points to the need for verifiable counterterrorism measures rather than verbal assurances.
Islamabad insists its only demand in the Istanbul talks was that Afghanistan prevent its territory from being used by groups targeting Pakistan, an obligation agreed under the 2020 Doha Agreement and reaffirmed to China, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Turkey. Pakistan also sought verification and joint monitoring mechanisms, which Kabul refused.
“Instead of acting upon the core expectation from Pakistan, not to allow Afghan territory to be used for attacks against Pakistan, the Taliban regime has always tried to shy away from taking concrete and verifiable actions,” the Foreign Office stated on Sunday.
The country further underscores that it has hosted over four million Afghan refugees for more than forty years at enormous economic cost. Islamabad notes that Kabul provides no documentation or support to returning refugees, and therefore cannot accuse Pakistan of irresponsibility in repatriation measures.
Traders emphasized that transit trade operates both ways, with Pakistan serving as Afghanistan’s main corridor for imports and exports, handling nearly 65–70% of Afghan transit volumes. Following the Taliban takeover, Islamabad increased coal imports from Afghanistan and extended multiple trade concessions to support Kabul’s cash-strapped government. In the fiscal year 2022 (ending June 30), Pakistan’s coal imports from Afghanistan rose significantly, particularly in the latter part of the year, shifting away from international supplies such as South Africa, which alone saw a 50% increase compared to the previous year. While trade disruptions impact both countries, Afghan traders bear the brunt of the economic strain due to their reliance on Pakistani routes and port access.
Meanwhile, Kabul’s recurring claims of internal division in Islamabad’s Afghanistan policy are rejected. Officials reiterate that civilian and military leadership remain aligned on core security concerns. Reflecting this consensus, the Defence Minister highlighted public awareness and consensus on the Afghan Taliban’s sponsorship of terrorism: “The people of Pakistan, especially those of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, are fully aware of the treacherous and barbaric patronization of Indian-sponsored terrorism by the Afghan Taliban regime and harbor no illusions about its intent or conduct.”
The government maintains that its counterterrorism policy is rooted in national security and regional stability and will continue until cross-border militant sanctuaries are dismantled.
Conclusion
The breakdown of the Istanbul dialogue highlights a widening trust deficit between Kabul and Islamabad. While the Afghan Taliban portrays Pakistan’s security concerns as exaggerated or internal, evidence of TTP leadership based in Afghanistan and recurring cross-border attacks undermines that narrative.
Analysts note that Pakistan’s stance is grounded in verifiable counterterrorism requirements, whereas Kabul continues to externalize responsibility and avoid enforcement commitments. Without concrete action against militant sanctuaries and a mutually agreed accountability mechanism, diplomatic statements and rhetorical justifications will not resolve the core issues driving the impasse.
