No Interest in Destabilising Kabul, Security Cooperation is the Only Demand: Pakistan

Islamabad / Kabul — As tensions between Kabul and Islamabad continue to simmer following months of border clashes, failed Istanbul talks, and a rapid diplomatic tilt by the Taliban toward India, regional observers say the current chill has revived a familiar rumour mill: allegations that Pakistan is quietly exploring alternatives to the Taliban government.

A recent long-form piece by New Lines Magazine amplified those speculations, suggesting Islamabad had begun “sounding out” figures linked to the Afghan opposition. But diplomats, security officials and analysts in the region say the narrative overshoots reality, noting that neither the political climate nor Islamabad’s objectives point toward any appetite for destabilising Afghanistan.

Analysts: No Playbook for Regime Change

Multiple officials familiar with regional security discussions told this newspaper that Islamabad has “no interest” in triggering political upheaval across the border, warning that even minor instability in Afghanistan spills over into Pakistan “within weeks, not months.”

According to one senior diplomat, claims of Pakistan “shopping for proxies” ignore the strategic cost: “Another vacuum in Kabul would send hundreds of thousands of refugees to Pakistan, strengthen transnational militancy, and collapse whatever economic activity Afghans have left. It’s simply not a rational policy option.”

Security researchers echo that view, arguing that Pakistan’s current posture is shaped less by rivalry and more by risk calculus. “The only red line repeatedly communicated in diplomatic channels,” one analyst said, “is cross-border militancy. Beyond that, Islamabad’s stated preference remains a stable neighbour, not a pliant one.”

A Single Ask: Stop Cross-Border Militancy

While relations have deteriorated sharply over the Taliban’s refusal to act against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), experts note that Islamabad’s demands remain limited and grounded in international norms: states must prevent their territory from being used against neighbours.

This position, they argue, aligns with global counterterrorism frameworks and has been echoed by numerous regional actors since 2021. Pak-Afghan affairs expert, Salman Javed described the situation bluntly that “There’s no grand design. There’s one issue, cross-border attacks. Solve that, and half the current friction disappears.”

Speculation Grows as Kabul Looks to India

The latest wave of speculation coincides with a rapid and very public recalibration in Afghanistan’s foreign outreach, particularly the Taliban leadership’s growing closeness with New Delhi. High-profile visits, increasingly warm public messaging, and India’s decision to upgrade its Kabul mission have collectively raised eyebrows across the region.

Analysts note that the concern in Islamabad is not rooted in optics alone, but in hard security precedent. For years, Pakistani officials and independent security researchers have warned that India’s intelligence footprint in Afghanistan has historically intersected with networks hostile to Pakistan, including elements of the TTP, BLA, and other anti-state outfits operating from the Afghan side of the border.

Salman Javed also noted that “States re-align all the time, that part is normal. What isn’t normal is when re-alignment creates space for groups that have repeatedly targeted Pakistan.”

Another analyst said that India’s renewed access in Kabul, if left unchecked, risks re-activating a proxy ecosystem that Pakistan had spent over a decade trying to contain.

Despite this, observers underline that Pakistan’s current approach remains measured. The primary concern, they say, is preventing Afghan soil from being used as a launchpad for cross-border militancy, not engineering political change in Kabul.

Opposition Figures Back in the Spotlight

Reports of Afghan opposition members visiting Pakistan this October added fuel to the speculation. But sources familiar with those meetings describe them as exploratory and informal, a continuation of longstanding backchannels used for situational awareness, not a prelude to a political project.

A Kabul-based academic noted: “Every Afghan opposition figure seeks international engagement. That doesn’t automatically translate into regime-change plots.”

Propaganda or Misreading the Moment?

Veteran observers caution that the narrative around “proxy hunting” benefits actors on multiple sides, from hardliners in Kabul who frame external criticism as foreign hostility, to online networks eager to recycle Cold War-style tropes.

Across diplomatic circles, the consensus remains consistent: Pakistan’s posture toward Afghanistan is shaped by the desire for a predictable neighbour, functioning borders, and a halt to militant infiltration, not by ambitions to re-engineer Kabul’s political order.

As Salman Javed put it, summarising Islamabad’s current outlook: “Stability in Afghanistan is in Pakistan’s interest. Destabilisation isn’t. All that is asked is very straightforward, stop cross-border attacks, and build a normal neighbourly relationship.”