Taliban’s Transformation: From Ideological Fighters to Power, Profit and Internal Rivalries

KABUL — The Taliban of the 1980s and the Taliban ruling Afghanistan in 2025 represent two entirely different realities. What began as a grassroots religious movement driven by madrasa students and teachers has evolved into a centralized power structure dominated by commercial interests, factional rivalries, and patronage networks.

The movement originally emerged from the Afghan jihad, when most of its members were religious students from southern Afghanistan, especially Kandahar. Their motivations were spiritual and ideological, rooted in resistance to Soviet occupation and the defense of local communities during the civil war. Their lifestyle was austere, their financial needs were met locally, and their legitimacy stemmed from tribal ties, religious symbolism, and a reputation for simplicity. Large-scale commercial activity, criminal enterprises, and foreign investments were not associated with the early Taliban.

Senior writer and author at The Express Tribune, Shahbullah Yousafzai, told HTN that the contrast between the 1990s Taliban and the current leadership could not be sharper.

“Back then, the movement was purely religious in nature and operated under the spiritual authority of Mullah Omar. Spirituality was the basis for leadership and position.”

 He said.

 According to him, today’s leadership is shaped by two dominant factions, the Haqqani network and the Kandahari group, who were brought together under pressure from the United States and Qatar.

 “It is, in many ways, a ‘marriage of convenience.’ Both sides now compete for finances, power-sharing, and key positions. This is no longer a movement driven by faith, but by the interests of powerful groups,”

 he added.

Following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, analysts observed a major shift in the lifestyle and priorities of senior leaders. Many had spent decades abroad in Pakistan, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, cultivating business networks and accumulating personal wealth. Reports of investments and property ownership in Dubai, Karachi, Quetta, and Islamabad stand in sharp contrast to the austere image projected by the Taliban of the 1990s.

Haq Nawaz Khan, an Independent journalist who has closely monitored the Taliban administration over the past four years, described the movement as unable to operate beyond the narrow confines of its own worldview.

“The reins of government are firmly in their hands, but their capacity is far lower than many expected,”

 He said.

He added that predictions of a softer Taliban approach proved misplaced, particularly as decisions on major issues such as women’s education and employment remain tightly controlled by their reclusive supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, who is known for his uncompromising positions.

Khan also said the Taliban’s diplomatic posture has shifted noticeably.

“Once they established direct engagement with the United States, the influence of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE weakened significantly.”

 He noted. Discussing Pakistan–Afghanistan relations, he stressed that the two neighbors are bound by geography.

“The closure of trade routes hurts both sides, but Afghan traders and businesses in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan suffer the most. Pakistan remains the shortest and most practical trade corridor. Afghanistan must acknowledge this reality.”

 He said.

As the current regime consolidates power, corruption and informal revenue networks have become deeply embedded in its governance model. Analysts point to widespread extortion targeting traders, transporters, and farmers, the continued use of kidnappings for ransom, and extensive smuggling across borders, including minerals and narcotics, as major sources of income. The Taliban’s monopolistic control over customs and trade routes has further strengthened patronage networks benefiting senior figures and their inner circles. Transparency in financial matters remains largely absent, with accusations that public revenue is diverted to factional interests rather than community welfare.

While the original Taliban movement was driven by religious purity and ideological zeal, today’s leadership appears to apply ideology selectively, often to suppress dissent or consolidate authority while prioritizing financial and political gain. This shift has placed a heavy burden on ordinary Afghans, who face unpredictable taxation, extortion, kidnappings, high prices due to monopolized trade routes, and weak or nonexistent public services.

Despite seeking global recognition and international assistance, many Taliban leaders have simultaneously secured investments and property abroad, a move critics interpret as preparation for potential future instability. This dual approach underscores a transformation from an ideological movement to one deeply influenced by personal enrichment and factional rivalry.

The Taliban of the 1980s were religiously driven fighters who enjoyed local legitimacy and lived modest lives. The Taliban of 2025 are entrenched rulers operating within a system shaped by internal divisions, corruption, and commercial ambitions. Ideology remains present, but largely as a tool of control. For ordinary Afghans, this evolution has offered little hope, as daily life remains overshadowed by insecurity, economic pressure, and ineffective governance.