A Tragedy Born Out of Operational Recklessness
When nine people, including forensic experts, were killed in the Srinagar police station blast, Indian authorities immediately framed it not as a terror attack, but as an “unfortunate accident.” Yet this tragedy unfolded just days after the New Delhi car blast, an explosion near the Red Fort linked to a 26-day investigation that began with a simple pamphlet pasted on a wall in Srinagar. When both incidents are examined together, a disturbing pattern emerges:
“India’s internal security architecture is failing at the most basic level of detection, storage, and strategic risk assessment.”
A Story India Doesn’t Want to See
On the surface, the two events seem unconnected. One happened in Delhi, the other in Kashmir. One was labelled terrorism, the other “accidental.” But their origins intersect at a common point: intelligence negligence.
The Delhi blast investigation started with a green-topped Urdu pamphlet attributed to Jaish-e-Muhammad. Instead of treating it as an early-warning indicator, security agencies used it merely as an entry point to cast an extremely wide net raiding hundreds of homes and detaining over 650 people.
But raids are not a strategy and detentions are not intelligence.
The months-long surveillance failed to intercept a car carrying explosives into the national capital, where it detonated in a high-security zone. A network of clerics, doctors, and students allegedly radicalized went undetected for months. Nearly 3,000 kg of explosive material was stored in civilian neighbourhoods without the slightest radar blip from Indian intelligence.
This raises a fundamental question:
If India can miss a 3-tonne explosive stockpile, what exactly is its counterterror architecture doing?
A Tragedy Born Out of Operational Recklessness
Just days later, a second failure exploded, literally.
Nine people died inside a Kashmir police station while sifting through confiscated explosive material. This wasn’t the act of an enemy; it was the state’s own procedural negligence. Highly sensitive material was stored in an ordinary building, not a secure facility, without proper disposal protocols. Forensic officers and policemen worked inside a confined room without blast containment equipment.
This is not an unfortunate incident but a systemic breakdown that mirrors the same weaknesses seen in the Delhi case: Improper storage, mismanagement, lack of expertise, and overconfidence disguised as control.
India’s Strategic Security Paradox: High on Rhetoric, Low on Capability
New Delhi frequently claims that militancy in Kashmir has been reduced to “zero,” but the Delhi car bombing and the Srinagar station explosion paint a far more troubling picture. India’s security model appears to prioritise political messaging over genuine strategic preparedness. While the government insists militancy is defeated, radical networks continued to operate quietly in Kashmir, explosives were transported across state borders, educated professionals allegedly joined covert modules, and a loaded car bomb was able to reach the capital without interception. At the same time, a police station stored explosives as casually as warehouse scrap. This is not the behavior of a state in total control; it reflects a country struggling to detect, secure, and manage internal threats.
Why India Won’t Accept Responsibility?
For the Indian state, branding incidents as “terrorism” is politically convenient, while admitting internal negligence is politically damaging. This explains why the Delhi blast was swiftly framed as a terror attack, whereas the Srinagar explosion was theatrically softened as an unfortunate accident. Such narrative manipulation allows the government to project authority, shift blame to external actors, avoid institutional accountability, justify its harsh counterinsurgency measures, and continue expanding securitization in Kashmir. Yet these narratives crumble when placed beside the operational facts. A state that cannot safely store explosives cannot claim excellence in counterterrorism. A state that arrests 650 Kashmiris yet fails to catch a car bomb entering Delhi cannot declare victory over militancy. And a state that loses nine officials due to its own mishandling cannot present itself as strategically flawless. Political storytelling may protect the government’s image, but it does little to strengthen national security.
The Strategic Cost:
Internal threats intensify because India repeatedly fails to understand, monitor, and manage them. Strategic negligence generates deepening radicalisation through alienation, creates gaps in intelligence collection, promotes an overreliance on raids rather than long-term surveillance, weakens inter-agency coordination and results in the overextension of security forces across political priorities. These vulnerabilities are amplified when political leadership exploits security crises instead of addressing structural weaknesses. The Delhi blast and the Srinagar station tragedy are therefore not isolated lapses but are symptoms of an overstretched, under-prepared counterterror system that is cracking under its own weight.
India Cannot Pretend Its Mistakes Are Accidents
When the dots between the Delhi attack and the Srinagar explosion are connected, a clear and troubling pattern emerges: poor monitoring, mishandled intelligence, procedural recklessness, and a reliance on securitisation without meaningful strategy. India’s habit of blaming Pakistan for every spark masks a deeper issue. Its own institutional mismanagement often acts as the fuel that turns sparks into fire. Until New Delhi confronts its internal failures, it will continue to overlook warning signs, mishandle sensitive materials, and rebrand preventable tragedies as “accidents.” The cost of this denial will be measured not only in human lives, but also in the gradual erosion of India’s credibility as a responsible security actor in the region.
