![Taliban government spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid during a press conference in Kabul, Afghanistan, on September 21, 2021. [Courtesy: AP].](https://htnworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/2821516-1316215333.webp)
Kabul — Zabihullah Mujahid, spokesperson for the interim Government of Afghanistan, said the latest round of Pakistan–Afghanistan talks in Istanbul failed to produce an agreement because Islamabad pressed Kabul to “take responsibility for security inside Pakistan” — a demand he called beyond Afghanistan’s remit. “That is not within Afghanistan’s capability, and we were not committed to any such security responsibility,” he told reporters, adding that “for now the meeting is suspended.”
Mujahid opened by thanking Türkiye and Qatar for mediating the two-day talks and said the Afghan delegation attended “with goodwill and competence,” hoping Pakistan would “reach a positive outcome.” Despite “all the efforts of the mediators,” he said, “the Pakistani side did not reach a meaningful result.” Reiterating the Taliban regime’s standard formulation, he said: “No one is allowed to use Afghan soil against anyone else.”
The Afghan spokesman framed the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as a long-running Pakistani problem rooted in Islamabad’s policies after 2001, asserting that “the insecurity and the existence of the TTP have existed since 2002,” which he blamed on “the wrongful policies of the Pakistani military” that “allied itself with the United States” and permitted operations in the tribal belt. He accused “some specific military groups in Pakistan” of opposing “a strong and centralized government, security, development, peace, and stability in Afghanistan,” claiming these elements “historically benefited from Afghanistan’s insecurity.”
To buttress the argument that TTP predates the IEA’s return to Kabul, Mujahid recited a chronology of Pakistani military operations and major attacks dating to the 2000s. He cited “Operation Al-Mizan” in 2002 in North and South Waziristan; the 2009 South Waziristan “Rah-e-Nijat” campaign; subsequent Khyber-1 to Khyber-4 actions; and the 2014 North Waziristan push that “displaced nearly one million people,” some of whom he said crossed into Khost, Paktia and Paktika. On attacks inside Pakistan, he listed incidents including the 2008 Danish embassy bombing in Islamabad, the 2009 Peshawar Mina Bazar blast, and the December 2014 Peshawar school massacre, arguing such “high-profile incidents… prove that the TTP and insecurity have been a longstanding problem in Pakistan.”
Mujahid also described steps the Taliban say they have taken since 2021: a monitoring commission; “a sharia ruling and fatwa… against anyone who leaves Afghanistan to wage jihad abroad without the Emir’s permission”; and, crucially, facilitation of talks in which, he claimed, “approximately ninety-five percent (95%) of issues” between Pakistan and the TTP were agreed during a “nationwide ceasefire.” He asserted that “when General Bajwa’s term concluded and General Asim Munir came into the picture, the whole process was sabotaged,” adding that “conspiracies were also made against Imran Khan and General Faiz Hameed.” He insisted: “The Islamic Emirate played a positive role and did not play any negative role.”
Addressing border tensions, Mujahid alleged that “a few days ago there was an attack by Pakistan along the Durand Line near Boldak,” saying the IEA “did not respond because we respected the negotiations.” Still, he warned: “Afghanistan has the right to defend itself… the nation… will defend and protect its land and borders. No one will be permitted to interfere or to violate our territory.” He said mediators “were also disappointed; they understood that the Pakistani side spoke unreasonably and took an unreasonable position,” while adding Kabul “welcomes” Qatar and Türkiye’s continued role and “does not see the need for other mediators at this time.”
Turning to migration, Mujahid said the IEA “is prepared to receive and manage displaced people,” and argued that Afghans who moved into Afghanistan did so due to “faulty policies and violent operations in tribal areas.” He urged Pakistan to “restrain such elements” that could destabilize the region and called on “countries and the United Nations” to take note of “those who misuse weapons and violate others’ territories.”
Pakistan’s position
Pakistani officials and security sources, responding to Mujahid’s remarks, rejected his characterizations. Islamabad maintains it has been “highly cooperative and consistent, with a clear and firm focus on ensuring cross-border security,” insisting that its single-point agenda in Istanbul was to curb “cross-border terrorism originating from Afghan soil.” Officials say Pakistan has provided “irrefutable evidence” at multiple forums, including the Istanbul track, that the TTP continues to operate from Afghanistan.
Citing international assessments, Pakistani interlocutors ask whether “the United Nations, SIGAR, and other international reports are all lying about the presence of TTP, BLA, and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan,” arguing that “every credible report points toward Afghanistan, not Pakistan.” They also contend the Taliban reneged on commitments under the 2020 Doha Agreement, notably intra-Afghan talks and ensuring that released prisoners did not rejoin militancy. Pakistani voices further criticize the IEA’s governance, saying it is dominated by former militant commanders and lacks representation from non-Pashtun communities, contrary to promises of an inclusive government.
On refugees, Islamabad stresses it has hosted “around four million” Afghans over decades, providing education, healthcare and livelihoods “despite its own challenges,” and rejects the portrayal of recent cross-border movement as ordinary migration, arguing “TTP and BLA terrorists crossed the border,” and demanding their arrest and handover.
Security agencies point to a sharp escalation in violence since August 2021, citing internal tallies of 207 attacks in 2021, 262 in 2022, 306 in 2023 and 1,099 in 2024, alongside claims of “58 terrorist camps, staging posts, and lodging facilities” for TTP and BLA inside Afghanistan. Pakistan says that from June 2025, “172 tashkeels (about 4,000 militants) infiltrated Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,” with additional groups moving into Balochistan from Zabul, Paktika, Kandahar, Helmand and Nimroz. Between April and September 2025, officials say, security forces “neutralized 135 Afghan nationals” in KP and Balochistan, and “Afghan nationals conducted suicide bombings” in multiple attacks between 2022 and 2025.
Pakistani officials also underline high-profile cases: the 31 July 2022 United States strike that killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul’s Sherpur; United Nations monitoring that estimates several thousand TTP fighters across Afghan provinces; and allegations that senior TTP figures reside openly in Afghanistan. Islamabad characterizes Kabul’s stance, that TTP is a purely internal Pakistani issue, as “misleading and self-contradictory,” noting that the IEA’s own intelligence service has announced operations against ISIS and others inside Afghanistan, implicitly acknowledging the presence of transnational militants.
Why the Istanbul round matters
The Istanbul process that collapsed this week was not an isolated attempt but the follow-up to the 19 October Doha ceasefire, when Qatar and Türkiye brokered an agreement committing both Pakistan and Afghanistan to halt cross-border attacks and deny support to militant groups. The Istanbul meetings, held 25–30 October, produced a joint Turkish statement outlining a framework for further coordination and a plan to form joint monitoring mechanisms.
The 5 November follow-up round, meant to finalise that framework, instead stalled, the Afghan delegation sought to expand the agenda to trade and transit, while Pakistan insisted that security and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) threat remain the centrepiece. That deadlock triggered Zabihullah Mujahid’s latest press conference.
The collapse came after a month of escalating violence: Pakistan’s 9 October precision strikes in Kabul and Paktika against anti-Pakistan militants, retaliatory Taliban attacks along the border on 11–12 October, and further Pakistani air operations through mid-October. UNAMA later confirmed dozens of civilian casualties across southern and eastern Afghanistan. Under international pressure, the Doha ceasefire temporarily quieted the front, until border skirmishes on 7 November broke it again just hours before the Istanbul talks were to reconvene.
For Islamabad, the Istanbul track was meant to turn ceasefire promises into verifiable counter-terror cooperation. For Kabul, it was a chance to fold economic and transit issues into the same diplomatic channel, a move Pakistan viewed as premature while cross-border attacks persisted.
Officials in Islamabad now say the Taliban’s public messaging, amplified by GDI-linked digital networks, has turned into an information campaign portraying Pakistan as the aggressor, a narrative Pakistani agencies dismiss as part of a coordinated Indo-Afghan disinformation nexus. Security analysts in Islamabad argue that while Pakistan has maintained restraint and sought mediation, “narrative warfare” from Kabul’s online ecosystem has undermined public trust in the process.
Mujahid, while denying Afghan responsibility for militancy in Pakistan, warned that Afghanistan “will defend its borders if attacked”, rhetoric that Pakistani officials interpret as deflection from the IEA’s failure to curb TTP sanctuaries.
What’s Next
With the Istanbul framework talks derailed, both sides publicly insist that dialogue remains open, but privately, officials in Ankara and Doha admit the process is “frozen until further notice.” Qatar and Türkiye continue to urge restraint, seeking to revive the joint verification mechanism that was meant to follow the 25–30 October round.
For Islamabad, the next phase hinges on action, not assurances. Officials maintain that Kabul must demonstrate verifiable steps against TTP sanctuaries, including dismantling camps, restricting movement, and extraditing known leaders. “Principles and pledges have been heard before,” a Pakistani official told HTN. “Implementation will determine whether trust can survive.”
Kabul, however, continues to press for what it calls a “comprehensive dialogue” that links security with trade, transit, and visa facilitation, while avoiding any binding text that could imply acceptance of Pakistan’s accusations. That resistance, Pakistani negotiators argue, reflects an attempt to keep plausible deniability over militant presence and to politically balance internal factions within the Taliban leadership.
Islamabad now views the Taliban’s public narrative, amplified by GDI-linked digital campaigns, as an organized attempt to deflect accountability and reshape regional perception, aligning closely with narratives emerging from India-backed digital networks. The information space, once peripheral, has become a core battleground alongside diplomacy and security operations.
Officials caution that while digital campaigns and selective storytelling may win short-term attention, they do little to address the security realities on the ground. At the same time, diplomats in Islamabad acknowledge that dialogue, however strained, remains preferable to escalation. “We’re still talking, that itself matters,” a senior official noted.
Mediators from Qatar and Türkiye are continuing discreet consultations with both sides, hoping to revive the framework through quiet confidence-building measures. Regional observers say progress now depends on practical cooperation, intelligence sharing, border coordination, and verifiable restraint, rather than on statements of principle.
For now, the border remains tense, the ceasefire fragile, and trust limited. Yet diplomats insist the door to engagement is still open. The Istanbul process, despite its setback, remains the only structured channel capable of preventing another spiral of confrontation, provided both Islamabad and Kabul can match words with measurable action.
