Afghanistan’s economic leadership, headed by Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, has ordered Afghan traders to sharply reduce commercial activity through Pakistan within three months, a dramatic shift that analysts say may harm Afghanistan far more than Pakistan. The directive accelerates Kabul’s move toward Uzbekistan, Iran, and other Central Asian corridors, despite higher costs and limited infrastructure.
Between 12 and 14 November, Baradar publicly urged traders, especially pharmaceutical importers, to cut reliance on Pakistani transit routes. He accused Pakistan of border shutdowns and of allowing low-quality medicines into Afghan markets. Afghan officials claim cargo flows through Iran and Central Asia are already rising.
Kabul is banking on recently renewed agreements with Uzbekistan, including a key MoU allowing Afghan agricultural exports to move through Tashkent via road and air routes. Iran’s Chabahar port, as well as corridors through Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, are being expanded with tariff and storage incentives. But Afghan traders warn that the alternative routes are significantly more expensive and less efficient. KP Sarhad Chamber of Commerce and Industry Vice President Shahid Husain said Afghan businessmen have appealed to Taliban foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, urging him to reach an understanding with Pakistan because they cannot sustain the high costs of Central Asian transit. Afghan authorities, however, may still enforce the directive through licensing and inspection controls.
The policy is widely seen as politically motivated, an attempt by Kabul to signal independence from Pakistan following months of border closures and disputes. Yet the economic fallout has been real: stranded cargo, spoiled perishables, and higher demurrage fees have shaken Afghan supply chains.
Meanwhile, Afghanistan faces immediate hardship. Central Asian and Iranian routes are longer, pricier, and lack Pakistan’s cold-chain, warehousing, and port efficiency. Costs of food, fuel, medicines, and construction materials are expected to rise, while supply disruptions—especially in pharmaceuticals may worsen.
In Pakistan, the direct impact is felt mainly in border areas. Former PAJCCI president Khan Jan Alkozai noted that bilateral trade, once over $3 billion, has fallen to $1.5 billion, with more than 11,000 Afghan-bound containers at times stuck in Karachi. Kabul has faced around $1.5 million in annual demurrage losses linked to Afghan-side delays. Pakistani agricultural exports to Central Asia, such as nearly half a million tons of potatoes last year, also rely on Afghan transit and could decline.
Even so, Pakistan’s wider economy remains insulated due to diversified exports and control over the region’s most efficient sea corridor. Former ambassador Masood Khan called Pakistan’s route “the natural, closest, and most efficient” for Afghanistan and Central Asia, arguing that Kabul’s decision will ultimately hurt Afghanistan more than Pakistan.
Central Asian states, however, stand to gain from increased transit revenue and political leverage. Iran’s Chabahar port may experience long-term growth, supported by India’s renewed engagement and U.S. sanctions waivers.
Yet major operational challenges persist. Central Asian infrastructure cannot yet absorb Pakistan’s volume. Customs differences, higher fuel and insurance costs, multiple borders, and corruption risks all hinder smooth transit.
The broader consequences could be far-reaching. Afghanistan risks rising inflation, smuggling, trader unrest, and further economic fragility, especially with foreign investment already down 60% and inflation at about 12%. Pakistan, meanwhile, may adopt a firmer policy stance, and regional logistics could gradually shift, though only if Central Asia and Iran can modernize fast.
Experts say Afghanistan could reduce the impact by phasing the transition and securing firm tariff guarantees from regional partners. Pakistan, for its part, could rebuild trade confidence through transparent border management and smoother operations at Karachi and Torkham.
Ultimately, the outcome hinges on whether Kabul’s political calculus outweighs the economic risks or whether the heavy costs force a recalibration of its trade strategy with Pakistan
