Pakistan’s Religious Diplomacy in Afghanistan: Losing Ground and What Must Change

When the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, Pakistan believed it held a unique advantage that no other state could claim, termed as religious affinity. Decades of shared Deobandi schooling, deep madrassa networks, and personal ties between Pakistani clerics and Taliban leaders were assumed to be natural channels of influence. Islamabad assumed that moral persuasion, guided by shared theology, could shape Afghan decision-making. Four years later, it is painfully clear that this assumption was dangerously optimistic. Pakistan’s religious diplomacy, its Ulema delegations, moral appeals, and historical ties have largely failed to translate into concrete influence, particularly on the pressing issue of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and cross-border security.

Ulema Delegations: Respect Without Leverage

Since 2021, Pakistan has sent more than a dozen religious delegations to Afghanistan, involving some of the most prominent figures in South Asian Islam. Mufti Taqi Usmani, Maulana Muhammad Tayyab, Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haideri, and even Maulana Fazlur Rehman held multiple meetings with Taliban leadership, all separately. These scholars carry immense moral authority, and many taught or mentored Taliban figures during their youth. Their presence commands respect. Yet, despite repeated visits and formal assurances, they have been unable to shift the Taliban’s policy on key issues such as TTP sanctuaries or border management. The message from Kabul remained consistent; respect was granted, but influence was denied. The Taliban repeatedly insist that the TTP issue is an internal Pakistani matter, and Afghanistan will not intervene.

The Taliban’s Ethno-Nationalist Mindset

The explanation lies in a profound ideological shift within the Taliban, which Pakistan has failed to understand. The movement’s religious worldview is no longer merely Deobandi, but an Afghan-Islamic, intensely nationalistic, and fiercely independent. The Taliban now see themselves as the sole custodians of Afghan Islam, deriving legitimacy from their sovereignty, victory, and adherence to Afghan tradition. Pakistani scholars, even those sharing the same school of thought, are seen as external actors linked to a state whose authority they do not recognize. Meanwhile, the TTP is perceived as ideological kin, and fighters who trained, struggled, and survived alongside the Taliban are viewed as more authentic adherents of jihadist purity than Pakistani Ulema, who operate within a state framework the Taliban disdain.

This rigid, almost pathological, commitment to ethno-nationalism explains the Taliban’s unwillingness to listen. They have developed a cognitive filter, interpreting even well-meaning guidance as a challenge to Afghan sovereignty. Shared theology no longer translates into alignment because the Taliban defines legitimacy in Afghan, Pashto, and nationalist terms. This is why repeated Pakistani religious delegations, no matter how eminent, have failed to convince the Taliban to curb the TTP or honor border agreements fully. Moral persuasion is simply insufficient when confronted by a leadership convinced of its own doctrinal and political infallibility.

Other Regional Actors Have Moved Ahead

The contrast with other regional players is stark. Saudi Arabia has paired religious outreach with structured training programs and significant economic incentives. The UAE has cultivated influence through mosque-building, direct engagement with Haqqani network leaders, and strategic investment. Qatar continues to leverage its long-standing Doha legacy to shape ideological narratives. Iran has expanded its presence in western Afghanistan through funding Shia seminaries and cultural institutions. All of these countries combine religion with tangible incentives and institutional frameworks. Pakistan, by contrast, relies heavily on goodwill, moral suasion, and episodic visits, leaving its religious diplomacy increasingly symbolic and largely ineffective.

The Limits and Value of Religious Diplomacy

This is not to say that religious diplomacy has been entirely without merit. It has preserved channels of communication during tense moments, maintained cross-border madrassa networks, and prevented religion from being weaponized in bilateral relations. These engagements have ensured that ideological rhetoric does not escalate into outright hostility, and they preserve a cultural bridge that could prove useful in the future. But in the absence of political, economic, and strategic levers, moral authority alone cannot compel the Taliban to act on Pakistan’s core interests.

Pakistan’s fundamental error has been to conflate historical influence with ongoing leverage. The Taliban are no longer students, but they are rulers who define their own religious and political trajectory. They reject external clerical authority, particularly on matters involving the TTP, because listening would compromise both their sovereignty and their perception of Afghan Islamic purity. Islamabad has assumed that shared theology could substitute for strategy, but Kabul has demonstrated repeatedly that ideology alone cannot dictate behavior.

A Way Forward for Pakistan

Going forward, Pakistan must recalibrate its religious diplomacy. Ulema delegations should continue, but they must be complemented by structured engagement, economic incentives, and political negotiation. A formal Pakistan–Afghanistan Ulema Council could provide continuity in dialogue and foster cooperation in education, madrassa development, and anti-extremism initiatives. Religious outreach should be tied to tangible benefits, scholarships for Afghan students, joint fatwa programs, and madrassa reconstruction, rather than symbolic visits. Pakistan should also work to delegitimize TTP doctrinally by framing the group as in rebellion against a legitimate Muslim state, thereby challenging the Taliban’s perception of their ideological kinship. Direct engagement with Kandahar, where the senior ulema council and decision-making centers reside, is equally critical, as influence in Kabul alone is insufficient.

Ultimately, religious diplomacy remains valuable but insufficient. Faith can open doors, but it cannot move mountains on its own. Pakistan must acknowledge that the Taliban are no longer pliable students but sovereign rulers, guided by their own interpretation of Islam, reinforced by ethno-nationalism, and increasingly resistant to external advice, even from those sharing the same theological school. To regain relevance, Pakistan must pair religious outreach with political clarity, economic engagement, and institutional strategy. Only then can Islamabad hope to convert respect into influence, moral authority into practical leverage, and shared faith into strategic outcomes.