As India Courts Kabul, Taliban Policy Faces its Own Contradictions

As Afghanistan’s Minister of Industry and Commerce Nooruddin Azizi heads to New Delhi for talks on expanding trade and “diversifying” routes away from Pakistan, the symbolism has already begun to overshadow the substance. Azizi, himself a Kandahari and considered part of the inner economic circle aligned with directives emanating from Kandahar, arrives after a month of heightened Afghan signalling. Coming on the heels of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, widely regarded as part of Akhundzada’s kitchen cabinet, issuing one of the harshest economic ultimatums to date, directing Afghan traders to wind down commercial ties with Pakistan and shift wholesale to India, Iran, and Central Asia, the visit signals Kabul’s latest attempt to recast its economic geography through political posture.

It is also notable that Azizi arrives in Delhi less than a week after leading a high-ranking economic delegation to Iran’s Sistan–Baluchestan province on 15 November 2025, where he attended the Iran–Afghanistan Joint Economic Commission to discuss trade, investment, and infrastructure cooperation. This followed an earlier 11 November trip by the Taliban-appointed governor of Farah province, who also visited Iran for trade discussions, part of a pattern that underscores Kabul’s active economic engagement with Tehran even as it courts India.

It also comes at a moment when Iran has announced a mid-December regional meeting, bringing Russia, China, and neighbouring states together to address the Pakistan–Afghanistan crisis after the Istanbul format reached a deadlock — a reminder that Kabul’s economic diplomacy is now being closely watched and contested by multiple regional players. That Azizi is in Delhi just as Tehran prepares to convene regional stakeholders injects a competitive undertone into the visit that Kabul cannot easily ignore.

These overlapping timelines also highlight a tension: while Kabul publicly pursues India, it simultaneously depends on Iran’s corridors and has repeatedly expressed intentions, to rely more heavily on the Chabahar route amid friction with Pakistan.

But rhetoric, as the region has learned repeatedly, does not rewrite mountains, weather, logistics or hard numbers.

Cost of Political Signalling

The October–November closures of Torkham, Chaman, and Kharlachi, triggered by persistent militant activity, infiltration from Afghan soil, and Pakistan’s subsequent precision strikes on named militant targets, have frozen an annual trade system worth over US$1.8 billion.

Hindukush Tribune Network’s reporting from both sides of the border indicates that over 11,000 containers remain stuck, including Central Asian consignments that legally transit via Afghan routes. Some 50 fresh-produce containers rotted or were off-loaded at deep-loss prices.

To understand Kabul’s claims of “diversification,” the math is unavoidable. The Pakistan route costs roughly US$1,500 per container and takes 3–5 days, while the Iran–Chabahar route costs around US$2,000 per container with transit times of 10–15 days. Northern transit corridors are significantly more expensive, averaging US$3,000 per container and requiring 20–30 days, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) re-export hubs are costlier still, reaching up to US$4,000 per container with delivery windows between 15–25 days. At scale, shifting even a fraction of annual Pak–Afghan trade to these alternative corridors would multiply Afghan transport costs by 30–150 percent, an economic burden traders say is wholly unsustainable.

Behind Kabul’s combative messaging lies a quieter truth shared by truckers, brokers, and chamber representatives: the economic pain has fallen overwhelmingly on ordinary Afghans.

Revenue Shocks

Afghanistan’s customs revenues, of which nearly 70% depend on Pakistan’s corridor to Karachi and Port Qasim, have declined an estimated 25–30% in the final quarter of 2025.

Dollar inflows from Non-Governmental Organizations and United Nations agencies still enter the system, but these cover basic liquidity. They do not replace the thousands of cash transactions that the Pakistan corridor facilitates daily: loaders, drivers, packers, agents, cold-storage operators, shopkeepers.

Even Afghan businessmen who complain about documentation or port fees in Pakistan quietly acknowledge that the Pakistan route remains cheaper, flatter, and operational in winter, unlike the alternatives.

Baradar’s Hard Line vs. Economic Geography

Mullah Baradar’s 12 November remarks marked the sharpest public rebuke of Pakistan by a senior Taliban official since 2021. His demand for “guarantees” that border routes will never close, while issuing traders an ultimatum to pivot to Iran and India, fits well with the Emirate’s current political posturing.

But it also fits a less-discussed pattern: regional analysts note that Baradar received part of his training and education in India, and his outreach has long skewed in Delhi’s favour. India, for its part, has moved quietly but consistently, floating proposals such as an “Afghan–Hindu research and agricultural-capacity centre”, strategically designed to embed soft-power influence in Kabul’s economic policymaking.

What remains unspoken in Kabul’s rhetoric, however, is that any shift toward India inevitably complicates its balancing act with Iran, which sees itself, not Delhi, as the natural commercial and logistical partner for Afghanistan. Tehran’s investment in Chabahar, its trucking lobbies, and its desire to remain the primary western corridor for Afghan goods put it at odds with India’s expanding role. Azizi’s Delhi trip therefore risks signalling an alignment that Tehran may interpret as diluting its economic primacy, especially at a time when Iran is positioning itself as the main mediator in the Pakistan–Afghanistan standoff.

From the Trading Floor: A Sobering Counter-View

Speaking to HTN, Khan Jan Alokzai of the Pakistan–Afghanistan Joint Chamber offers a more grounded assessment, that “Karachi and Torkham are still the best options for Afghans; trade has to be done there. But if they stay closed, we will have to look elsewhere.”

In addition, Afghan trader groups estimate around US$1 million in losses each day since the closures. They warn that a politically forced decoupling, especially in essentials like pharmaceuticals, would “hurt Afghanistan more than Pakistan.”

Diversification, they agree, is sensible. Replacement is not realistic

Winter Realities and the Air-Corridor Feasibility

Winter has already begun slowing northern routes such as Hairatan–Salang, with avalanches and snow regularly halting transport. The Iran and Central Asia corridors add 20–30% higher costs and carry less than one-fifth of the volume that Torkham and Chaman typically absorb.

Air corridors to India and the Gulf provide high-value lanes for pine nuts and saffron. But even Kabul’s optimistic figures concede that air freight accounts for only 1–3% of total Afghan trade volume. It cannot move fuel, wheat, cement, steel, or the heavy cargo that keeps Afghan markets alive.

Who to Pay the Price?

The impact is already visible across Afghan markets. Food prices up 15–20%, diesel imports down nearly 40%, thousands of transport and loading jobs evaporated, shopkeepers in Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Khost squeezed between costlier wholesale rates and weakening consumer power.

Pakistan’s diversified, US$400+ billion economy has multiple fallback routes. Afghanistan does not. Its households absorb every shock directly.

Between Illusion and Reality

There is a widening gap between the Emirate’s political messaging and the economic realities facing Afghan citizens. Attempts to project resilience by courting India may offer short-term headlines, but not sustainable solutions.

Delhi can provide diplomacy, press optics, and limited corridor access. It cannot provide a flat, all-weather route that moves 80% of Afghanistan’s commerce. Nor can India guarantee what Iran is already seeking to shape: a regional framework that stabilises Afghanistan’s economy without alienating neighbouring states. Azizi’s timing therefore places Kabul at the intersection of two competing external expectations, Indian outreach on one side, and an Iranian-led stabilisation effort on the other.

A Moment for Realism

Kabul’s leadership has every right to pursue diversified trade ties. But framing Pakistan’s security-driven border management as “economic coercion,” while simultaneously turning to India for lessons in autonomy, exposes a contradiction the region cannot ignore.

And for all the claims of new opportunities with India, even Afghan traders quietly ask: if India charges one dollar per kilogram on Afghan exports and Afghan traders receive barely half a dollar in return, can Afghanistan truly survive on this equation?

Afghanistan’s trade map is shaped by geography, not slogans. For all the fiery rhetoric, the simple equation remains: Pakistan can manage without Afghan transit for a while; ordinary Afghans cannot manage without Pakistani access.

And no visit to Delhi, however high-profile, changes that fact.