Nuclear strategy is not a subtle game, yet the recent statements by retired Indian General Raj Shukla have attained a stunning, and dangerous, clarity. General Shukla publicly urged that India needed to make global nuclear strike forces, with the explicit purpose of holding American cities at risk, following the example of North Korea in its aggressive stance. It is not the abstract speculation of a scholar, but a senior Indian voice that is insisting on a fundamental, destabilizing shift in New Delhi’s doctrine; something the international community must take notice of.

This alarming rhetoric is supported by India’s efforts at developing its missile system. India, currently, holds the Agni-V, already boasting a range of 7,000-8,000 km, putting much of the world within its reach. Far more concerning is the ongoing development of the Agni-VI, which is projected to achieve an intercontinental range of 9,000-16,000 km. This makes it clear that India is going past a posture of doubtful regional deterrence to become a nuclear player with the ability to impose costs on any big world capital, including the United States.

The true paradox here lies in the international community’s selective focus. Global media, Western think tanks, as well as policymakers, have in past decades speculated incessantly, alarmingly, about the nuclear posture of Pakistan, and its susceptibility to instability. However, the nuclear program and doctrine in Pakistan have been India-centric. Its potential is shaped and oriented solely to sustain a plausible, minimum deterrence to a vastly larger neighbor with conventional and nuclear weapons. The Pakistani approach is defensive, regionally bound, and geared towards averting aggression- a posture that is completely based on the South Asian security dilemma.

Why, then, is Pakistan repeatedly singled out as the primary threat to nuclear stability, while India’s open pursuit of capabilities and doctrine that extend far beyond South Asia to encompass global powers is often treated as a quiet necessity of its great power status?

By asking India to threaten American cities, in effect, deprives India of its long-standing, albeit frequently challenged, strategic ambiguity and places its non-first use policy under scrutiny. By openly modeling its nuclear strategy on a state whose primary geopolitical function is to menace the United States, India is dramatically escalating its profile and potential for conflict beyond its immediate neighborhood.

The Agni-VI missile is not merely about intimidating China; it is about acquiring a seat at the table of nuclear nations worldwide with its readiness to play a risky game of brinkmanship. If the international community, particularly the powers being explicitly targeted by this emerging doctrine, fails to publicly challenge this grand strategy, they are tacitly endorsing a new model of deterrence that rewards explicit threats to the global order.

The call for “strategic clarity” from New Delhi must be met with equal clarity from the world. The most significant escalation in South Asia today is not Pakistan’s static, defensive posture, but the dynamic, global-ambition doctrine being articulated and built by India. It is not a question of whether India can achieve American cities, but why it is openly proclaiming its strategic purpose in doing so, as the world does not subject it to the same level of scrutiny as it applies to other nations.