Pakistan–Afghanistan Tensions: Competing Claims, Mounting Public Pressure, and Turkey’s Quiet Mediation Efforts

The already strained relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan entered another tense phase after the Director‑General of the Inter‑Services Public Relations (ISPR), Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, issued a firm statement asserting that Pakistan “has not attacked Afghanistan” and that any Pakistani military action is always conducted “openly and officially.” The statement is part of Islamabad’s broader narrative: Pakistan’s conflict is with cross‑border terrorism, not with the Afghan people. Across the border, the Taliban regime maintains a contrasting position, accusing Pakistan of escalating tensions and violating Afghan sovereignty. The result is a widening diplomatic gap at a time when regional stability demands coordinated counter‑terrorism action, and when millions on both sides of the Durand Line remain economically and socially interconnected.

Pakistan’s Position: A State Under Continuous Cross‑Border Threat

For Pakistan, the issue revolves around security and credibility. Senior military officials argue that:

1. The Tehrik‑e‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP) maintains operational bases inside Afghanistan, posing a direct threat to Pakistan.

2. Islamabad has repeatedly shared actionable intelligence with Kabul, but no verifiable action has been taken against the groups responsible for attacks inside Pakistan.

3. The Taliban’s continued tolerance or inability to control militant sanctuaries has left Pakistan with limited options.

4. The presence of non‑custom‑paid vehicles in terror incidents reinforces the argument that Afghan‑based elements are exploiting unregulated movement across the border.

Pakistan’s political and security establishment insists that the Taliban regime must “act like a state,” not like a loosely structured revolutionary presence. The message is clear: cooperation is the only pathway forward, and trade cannot continue while Pakistan faces sustained attacks.

Taliban’s Claims: Sovereignty, Denial, and Strategic Ambiguity

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) rejects Pakistan’s accusations, insisting that:

1. No Afghan soil is being used against Pakistan.

2. Pakistan is exaggerating the TTP threat for political reasons.

3. Any cross‑border strikes would be considered a violation of sovereignty.

4. The Taliban cannot be held responsible for “ideological proximity” between the TTP and Afghan Taliban fighters, as both groups share historical, tribal, and cultural ties.

A major element of the Taliban narrative is denial combined with deflection. While they admit the presence of some militants, they argue that they inherited a complex environment after years of war and need time to stabilize. Their popular defence is: “Pakistan supported the Afghan jihad for decades; these are consequences of that era, not the decisions of today’s government.” This allows the Taliban to maintain internal legitimacy while avoiding confrontation with powerful militant factions.

Public Opinion: Emotion, Economics, and Evolving Mistrust

In Pakistan, a considerable portion of the public believes that the Taliban have not delivered on security guarantees, that Kabul’s refusal to act against the TTP is a betrayal of Pakistan’s sacrifices, and that Pakistan must adopt stricter border controls and trade terms. Some also argue that Pakistan’s long‑standing strategic approach to Afghanistan is partly responsible for today’s dilemma.

In Afghanistan, public opinion is shaped by deep mistrust of Pakistan’s intentions, a long‑standing perception of interference in Afghan affairs, growing frustration due to border closures and mass deportations, and economic fears that deteriorating ties could worsen hardship. Yet border communities, traders, and families divided across the Durand Line continue to support peaceful engagement because their survival depends on stability and commerce.

Turkey’s Growing Role: A Regional Mediator with Unique Leverage

Amid intensifying rhetoric, Turkey has quietly stepped forward as a potential mediator. Ankara enjoys warm military and diplomatic ties with Pakistan, cultural and religious acceptance in Afghanistan, a reputation for neutrality, and strategic ambitions in Central and South Asia. Diplomatic insiders indicate that Turkey has:

1. Initiated back‑channel discussions to reduce hostility.

2. Encouraged Kabul to take symbolic, verifiable steps against militants.

3. Urged Islamabad to maintain dialogue rather than coercive isolation.

4. Proposed trilateral mechanisms involving intelligence and security officials.

For Turkey, a stable Afghanistan creates economic routes and expands influence toward the heart of Asia. Both Kabul and Islamabad see Ankara as a trusted actor capable of preventing escalation.

Conclusion

Pakistan and Afghanistan are bound by geography and culture, yet deeply divided by conflicting narratives. The present crisis is more than a diplomatic quarrel; it is a test of statecraft for both governments. Pakistan demands verifiable action against militants; the Taliban insist on sovereignty and denial. Public pressure is growing on both sides as economic and social consequences deepen. Amid this turbulence, Turkey’s mediation represents the most credible path toward de‑escalation. Whether this moment becomes another chapter of regional instability or the beginning of pragmatic cooperation depends on how Islamabad and Kabul handle the next diplomatic steps.