Newsflash:

IRS Report Exposes Taliban’s Deep Links with TTP: 80% of Cross-Border Attackers Are Afghan Nationals

A new policy brief warns that Afghanistan has transformed into the epicenter of anti-Pakistan terrorism, urging a unified international strategy to compel the Taliban regime to dismantle terror networks.

5 min read

October 21, 2025

Islamabad —The Institute of Regional Studies (IRS), based in Islamabad, has released a comprehensive policy brief revealing that the Afghan Taliban’s support for Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has gone far beyond providing safe havens; it now includes direct organizational participation.

According to the policy brief, TTP’s “tashkeeli” (organizational) groups are now operating under Taliban patronage, fueling a new wave of terrorism in Pakistan. The report urges the international community to develop a joint strategy to pressure the Taliban into ending its support for terrorist groups operating from Afghan soil.

Senior Research Analyst Syed Imran Sardar authored the policy brief.

Executive Summary

The report highlights that since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, cross-border terrorism in Pakistan has significantly increased. Concrete evidence, field reports, and identification of killed militants confirm that most attackers are Afghan nationals.

It states that the Taliban government in Afghanistan has become the primary facilitator of anti-Pakistan terrorism. Between June and September 2025, the number of organized terrorist groups increased by 36%, while cross-border militant infiltration rose by 48%. Approximately 70–80% of these militants were Afghan nationals, compared to just 5–10% in the past. The report reveals that Taliban assistance to the TTP includes providing sanctuary, financial support, weapons, travel arrangements, and logistical facilities.

Currently, the Taliban regime maintains over 60 active TTP camps across Afghanistan, which are conducting operations against Pakistan. The report stresses that this situation demands a comprehensive review of Pakistan’s security, diplomatic, and border management strategies to counter cross-border terrorism effectively.

Background

Following the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, Pakistan had hoped for improved border stability and cooperation against the TTP. However, the opposite occurred; the Taliban and TTP’s ideological and operational alignment turned Afghanistan into a haven for terrorism.

Despite Pakistan’s repeated diplomatic efforts and global appeals, the Taliban have not taken any action against TTP, instead continuing to support it. By 2025, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border will have become South Asia’s most active terrorist corridor, threatening peace, trade, and counterterrorism progress in the region.

Key Observations and Evidence

Between June and September 2025, around 4,000 militants belonging to 172 groups infiltrated Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from Afghanistan. Similarly, 83 TTP formations carrying 1,200 fighters entered Balochistan from Zabul, Paktika, Kandahar, and Nimruz provinces. Out of these, 70–80% were Afghan citizens.

The policy brief notes that on 7 August 2025, all 70 terrorists killed in an operation by Pakistani forces in Sambaza, Zhob (Balochistan), were Afghan nationals, and their bodies were officially requested for return by the Afghan government.

Likewise, between April 25–26, 45 Afghan militants were killed in North Waziristan, while by the end of September, 267 Afghan nationals were confirmed dead in various operations. From April to September 2025, 135 Afghan militants were killed across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.

Afghan citizens were also involved in several high-profile attacks, including the September 3 attack on Frontier Constabulary Headquarters in Bannu, where three of the six attackers were Afghan nationals. In Chaman (October 15), Pakistani forces killed an Afghan suicide bomber. Similar Afghan involvement was confirmed in attacks in North Waziristan, Bannu, and Quetta.

Taliban’s Direct Involvement

According to the report, the Taliban government pays 50,000 Afghanis in compensation to families of Afghan TTP fighters killed in Pakistan. TTP chief Noor Wali Mehsud reportedly resides in Kabul under Taliban protection, receiving a monthly stipend of $43,000.More than 60 TTP camps operate in Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Khost, and Paktika provinces. The UN’s 36th Monitoring Report confirms that joint training facilities for TTP and Al-Qaeda exist within Afghanistan.

The Taliban have also supplied TTP fighters with U.S. weapons worth over $7 billion, including M4 and M16 rifles, carbines, night-vision devices, and other NATO arms. Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) issues movement passes to TTP militants, allowing them to cross Afghan checkpoints freely while armed.

Propaganda and Recruitment Network

TTP’s media wing, Umar Media, operates freely from Afghanistan, spreading extremist propaganda through encrypted platforms. Videos show Noor Wali Mehsud addressing public gatherings in Afghan provinces, urging Afghan youth to wage “jihad” against Pakistan. The report also notes that Taliban military units are actively recruiting fighters for the TTP and providing protection to their training camps.

Implications and Impact

The Taliban’s state-sponsored terrorism poses a severe threat to Pakistan’s internal security. Cross-border infiltration data confirms that Afghanistan has become both a source and an operational base of terrorism. The Taliban’s refusal to comply with international counterterrorism norms has also become a serious diplomatic challenge for Pakistan. Their dual policy denial in statements but active support on the ground has created strategic complications for Islamabad.

The report stresses the urgency of enhancing border fencing, surveillance, and coordination systems, particularly across Chaman, Zhob, and North Waziristan sectors. The use of U.S.-made weapons by terrorists is described as a matter of global concern, with the aftermath of NATO’s withdrawal now directly threatening regional stability.

Policy Recommendations

  1. Diplomatic Action: Pakistan should share verified evidence and UN reports with global institutions, including the OIC, EU, U.S., and China, to increase pressure on the Taliban.
  2. Regional Platforms: Activate SCO, ECO, and SAARC frameworks for a joint regional counterterrorism plan.
  3. Conditional Engagement: Any future cooperation with the Taliban must be conditioned on verified dismantling of TTP camps.
  4. Border Security: Deploy drones, night-vision systems, and ground radars along border areas and grant border forces preemptive operational authority.
  5. Intelligence Fusion: Establish joint fusion cells for real-time intelligence sharing and block terror funding channels through FATF mechanisms.
  6. Narrative Building: Launch a global awareness campaign to expose the Taliban’s duplicity and counter extremist recruitment among Afghan youth.

Conclusion

The report concludes that data from 2024–2025 clearly demonstrates how Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, has become the principal enabler of anti-Pakistan terrorism. Afghan nationals are not only participants but have become integral to TTP’s operational structure. By providing militants with safe havens, financial resources, and freedom of movement, the Taliban regime now poses a direct threat to Pakistan’s national security, regional stability, and global counterterrorism efforts. The IRS policy brief urges the world to adopt a coordinated international approach to compel the Taliban government to end its sponsorship of terrorist groups once and for all.

Related Articles

Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov visits Afghanistan to review progress on the TAPI gas pipeline project, marking a new phase of regional economic cooperation.
Ceasefire or Strategy? What Lies Behind Mullah Yaqoob’s Doha Remarks on Pakistan”
Militants target Sui Northern crew and Frontier Corps post near Kot Lalu; eight attackers killed in swift counter-operation
PAF contingent lands in Baku to participate in Exercise Indus Shield Alpha and showcase long-range refueling capability

Post a comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *